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INTRODUCTION 
On January 26, 2011, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) settled charges against respondents Daniels Trading Group LLC 
and two of its employees.1 According to the CFTC, the respondents 
violated the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA) by exceeding speculative 
position limits in rough rice futures contracts traded on the Chicago Board 
of Exchange.2 The CFTC described its case against the respondents in a 
publicly released Order Instituting Proceedings (CFTC Order).3 In the 
Order, the CFTC explained that it had “reason to believe” that the re-
spondents violated the CEA because they traded in excess of speculative 
position limits on at least thirty-eight trading days, among other violations.4 
Moreover, the CFTC stated that the respondents “were able to repeatedly 
violate speculative limits because [they] concealed the actual ownership and 
control of certain rough rice futures positions.”5 Although the respondents 
consented to the entry of the Order, they did so “[w]ithout admitting or 
denying any of the findings.”6  
The plaintiffs’ bar reacted quickly. One day later, on January 27, 2011, a 
class action complaint was filed in the Northern District of Illinois against 
all of the respondents named in the CFTC Order.7 Like the CFTC, the 
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants attempted to manipulate the rough 
rice futures market by trading in excess of speculative position limits.8 In 
their complaint, the plaintiffs quoted extensively from the CFTC Order.9 
For example, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants “were able to repeat-
edly violate speculative limits because [they] concealed the actual ownership 
and control of certain rice futures positions.”10  
 
1 See Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Ill. Traders 
Andrew Daniels, Ed Taylor & Daniels Trading Grp. LLC to Pay $2 Million & Imposes Trading 
Prohibition for Violating Rough Rice Speculative Position Limits & Concealing Material Facts 
from the CME Grp. (Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/ 
pr5975-11.  
2 Id.  
3 In re Daniels et. al, 11-05, Order Instituting Proceedings (CFTC Jan. 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfdaniel
sorder012611.pdf [hereinafter CFTC Order]. The Order also described the CFTC’s legal findings 
and the proposed settlement and ordered various forms of relief. Id. at 3-8.  
4 Id. at 1, 3.  
5 Id. at 3.  
6 Id. at 1.  
7 See Class Action Complaint at 1, In re Rough Rice Commodity Litig., No. 11-618, 2012 WL 
473091, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2012).  
8 Id. at 2-3. 
9 See id. at 9-11 (quoting CFTC Order, supra note 3, at 3-4). 
10 Id. at 10.  
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The district court took a dim view of the allegations that were “derived 
wholesale” from the CFTC Order.11 It dismissed the complaint because 
plaintiffs’ recitation of the CFTC’s findings did not state a claim under the 
CEA.12 In reaching its decision, the court adopted the reasoning of the 1976 
Second Circuit opinion Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp.13 for the “well-
established precedent” that plaintiffs may not cite unadjudicated findings 
from consent decrees in their pleadings.14  
Contrary to the district court’s pronouncement, Lipsky’s meaning is not 
settled. Questions of whether and to what extent plaintiffs may properly 
rely on findings from consent orders have been litigated mostly at the 
district court level. Among the courts of appeals, only the Second Circuit in 
Lipsky has confronted the issue directly.15 Furthermore, commentators have 
provided little clarification, mostly offering functional advice for practition-
ers.16 Because the law on this question is unsettled, litigants have frequently 
disputed the matter, typically through motions to strike pursuant to Rule 
12(f) or Rule 11(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
On its face, Rule 12(f) does not require courts to strike references to 
consent orders. Rather, Rule 12(f) permits courts to strike any “redundant, 
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”17 To prevail on a motion to 
strike, the moving party generally must show: (1) no admissible evidence in 
support of the allegations is available; (2) the allegations are irrelevant; and 
 
11 In re Rough Rice, 2012 WL 473091, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
12 Id. at *4-7.  
13 551 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1976). 
14 In re Rough Rice, 2012 WL 473091, at *4. “A consent decree is a judgment or order that 
reflects the [parties’] settlement terms . . . and that contains an injunction.” Anthony DiSarro, Six 
Decrees of Separation: Settlement Agreements and Consent Orders in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 AM. U. 
L. REV. 275, 277 (2010). In contrast, a settlement without injunctive relief, but often with 
monetary relief, is referred to as a consent judgment. See id. at 277 n.2. For consistency, I will 
refer to “consent orders” without reference to the relief imposed because the technical differences 
between consent decrees, judgments, and orders are not relevant to my argument. Unlike most 
settlement agreements, consent orders are typically public. See id. They also tend to include a 
description of the facts and legal analysis, since many consent orders are submitted to courts for 
approval and enforcement. See id. (“[B]ecause a consent decree is a court order, the issuing federal 
court has the inherent power to enforce the consent decree.”). Some consent orders, like the 
CFTC Order, supra note 3, are adopted by an administrative agency but not by a court. This 
distinction is not relevant to my Comment.  
15 Cf. In re Rough Rice, 2012 WL 473091, at *5 (noting that the court could not locate any 
circuit court decisions answering the question of whether plaintiffs may state a market-
manipulation claim by “parroting” allegations from an unadjudicated CFTC settlement).  
16 See, e.g., Jonathan Eisenberg, Beyond the Basics: Seventy-five Defenses Securities Litigators 
Need to Know, 62 BUS. LAW. 1281, 1373-74 (2007) (summarizing recent decisions striking references 
to consent orders in complaints).  
17 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f ). 
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(3) the moving party would be prejudiced if the allegations were permitted 
to stand.18  
Lower courts, however, are divided in their application of Rule 12(f) to 
allegations relying on consent orders. Citing Lipsky, some courts hold that 
these allegations must be struck as per se immaterial under Rule 12(f). 
Other courts limit Lipsky’s reach and interpret Rule 12(f) to permit plaintiffs 
to derive allegations from consent orders. The latter group more persuasively 
argues that neither Lipsky nor Rule 12(f) requires courts to strike every 
allegation based on a consent order. Part I of this Comment describes the 
Lipsky decision and its application in lower courts. Properly construed, 
Lipsky has a narrow scope; it supports striking only those references to 
consent orders that ultimately would be inadmissible at trial. Otherwise, 
Lipsky and Rule 12(f) permit plaintiffs to rely on consent orders to allege 
facts establishing a claim of liability.  
 But that does not settle the matter. Plaintiffs must also satisfy the duty 
of independent investigation. Under Rule 11(b)(3), by submitting a signed 
pleading to the court, the attorney certifies that “to the best of the person’s 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable 
under the circumstances[,] . . . the factual contentions have evidentiary 
support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”19 
Judges may strike allegations that do not satisfy Rule 11(b)(3), though they 
need not engage in a separate Rule 12(f) inquiry to do so.20  
Recently, lower courts have considered whether plaintiffs can satisfy 
their Rule 11(b)(3) obligations when relying on consent orders. Part II 
describes various applications of Rule 11(b)(3) to complaints relying on 
consent orders and argues that courts should adopt a flexible approach 
because the duty of independent investigation varies with the circumstances 
of each case. Although courts generally agree that plaintiffs may not copy 
and paste allegations from consent orders without any independent investi-
gation, courts have applied divergent standards in more nuanced situations. 
In particular, courts have struggled to answer whether plaintiffs must 
 
18 In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., 891 F. Supp. 2d 458, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting SEC 
v. Lee, 720 F. Supp. 2d 305, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citation omitted)); see also 5C CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1382 (3d ed. 2004) 
(describing the elements of a Rule 12(f ) motion to strike and noting that judges possess “consider-
able discretion” to dispose of Rule 12(f ) motions).  
19 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3). 
20 See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1336.3 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing Rule 11 sanctions without reference to Rule 12(f ) 
considerations).  
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independently verify each allegation derived from consent orders and 
whether consent orders are sufficiently reliable sources. To effectively police 
compliance with Rule 11(b)(3) when plaintiffs derive allegations from 
consent orders, courts should require plaintiffs to provide notice of their 
reliance and to reasonably attempt to verify the information through other 
sources. Moreover, while courts should not treat all consent orders as 
inherently suspect, they should inquire into the reliability of a particular 
consent order.  
Although this Comment separates discussions of Rule 12(f) and Rule 
11(b)(3) into different Parts, the Rules interact and, in some instances, 
overlap.21 Notably, both rules limit the plaintiff ’s evidentiary burden at the 
pleadings stage. Under Rule 11(b)(3), a plaintiff is not required to plead 
admissible evidence. The plaintiff must only allege the existence of facts 
that will likely have evidentiary support after reasonable opportunity for 
further investigation or discovery. And under Rule 12(f), courts may strike 
allegations only after finding that there will be no available admissible 
evidence supporting the allegations.22 Neither rule requires any allegation 
or source to be especially probative or reliable.23  
Thus, Parts I and II share an argument: by aggressively striking refer-
ences to consent orders, many courts have imposed evidentiary and investi-
gative obligations on plaintiffs that are improper at the pleadings stage. 
When plaintiffs allege facts derived from consent orders, they will rarely 
violate Rule 11(b)(3), Rule 12(f), or even Lipsky if properly interpreted.  
 Notwithstanding this argument, Part III raises the concern that permit-
ting plaintiffs to rely on consent orders in pleadings could hamper regulatory 
enforcement policy. Regulatory agencies have compelling reasons to settle 
enforcement actions through consent orders. Accordingly, agencies typically 
limit the collateral effects of consent orders to preserve defendants’ incen-
tives to settle. These incentives may shift if the law clearly permitted 
plaintiffs to rely on consent orders when bringing suits that “piggyback” off 
of regulatory actions. However, Part III surmises that any shifts in incen-
tives would be minor. But even if regulatory enforcement policy favors 
 
21 Both rules, for example, permit courts to strike needless vulgarity or personal attacks from 
pleadings. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f ) (stating that courts may strike any “impertinent[] or 
scandalous matter”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1) (stating that a party may not submit a signed 
pleading or paper for “any improper purpose, such as to harass”).  
22 See In re Fannie Mae, 891 F. Supp. 2d at 471 (“To prevail on a motion to strike, a party 
must demonstrate that . . . no evidence in support of the allegations would be admissible.” 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
23 Rule 12(f ) allows courts to strike “immaterial” allegations. Rule 11(b) does not require 
allegations to be relevant, although subsection (1) prohibits plaintiffs from submitting pleadings 
for “any improper purpose.”  
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prohibiting plaintiffs from relying on consent orders, Parts I and II show 
that courts should not stretch Rules 11(b)(3) and 12(f) to give effect to this 
policy.  
I. RELIANCE ON CONSENT ORDERS UNDER  
LIPSKY AND RULE 12(f) 
Federal appellate courts rarely confront motions to strike under Rule 
12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.24 As a result, Lipsky has 
influenced dozens of district courts that are faced with motions to strike, 
including those where plaintiffs attempt to rely on consent orders.25 How-
ever, lower courts have struggled to apply Lipsky consistently because of the 
conflicting policies and rules it articulates, as well as the confusing set of 
facts underlying the decision.  
Section I.A describes the Lipsky opinion and suggests that the opinion is 
inconclusive on the extent to which plaintiffs may rely on consent orders in 
their pleadings. On the one hand, the opinion potentially supports a broad 
rule requiring courts to strike almost any allegation derived from a consent 
order. On the other hand, the opinion could be read narrowly to permit 
plaintiffs to allege information derived from consent orders and to use them 
as a source of information to suggest that admissible evidence will likely be 
available at trial. Section I.B discusses the various justifications that lower 
courts have offered to support the broad and narrow applications of Lipsky. 
Finally, Section I.C argues that the narrow application should be adopted 
based on a close reading of Lipsky, generally accepted motion to strike law, 
and pleadings-stage policy.  
 
24 Resolutions of Rule 12(f ) motions generally are not “final decisions” subject to appellate 
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of 
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts . . . .”); Harvey Aluminum v. Int’l 
Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, Local 8, 278 F.2d 63, 64 (9th Cir. 1960) (explaining 
that an order granting a motion to strike portions of a complaint is “purely interlocutory and not 
appealable”); 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.1 (2d ed. 1992) (“Orders granting or denying a 
motion to strike are not final, at least so long as a viable pleading remains.” (footnote omitted)). 
Moreover, district courts have “considerable discretion” to resolve such motions and frequently 
grant leave to amend complaints that have had allegations struck. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18.  
25 See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 76, 78-79 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing district court opinions applying Lipsky in motions to strike).  
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A. The Lipsky Decision 
The plaintiff in Lipsky brought breach of contract claims against defend-
ant Commonwealth United Corporation and a related entity.26 The plaintiff 
alleged that Commonwealth failed to use its best efforts in registering its 
common stock held by the plaintiff.27 Commonwealth had attempted to file 
a registration statement for the plaintiff ’s securities, but the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) never declared the statement effective.28 To 
show that Commonwealth could not have used its best efforts during this 
process, the plaintiff alleged that Commonwealth had, in two other instances, 
filed registration and proxy statements that the SEC claimed were defi-
cient.29 The plaintiff also attached an SEC complaint alleging that Com-
monwealth violated the securities laws with respect to these registration and 
proxy statements.30 Although these filings did not seek to register any of the 
plaintiff ’s securities, they did involve an identical class of Commonwealth 
stock and were relevant to the plaintiff ’s claims.31 The defendants moved to 
strike all allegations referring to the SEC complaint and the attached 
complaint itself, and the district court granted their motion pursuant to 
Rule 12(f).32  
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.33 
The court found that the SEC complaint and allegations referring to it were 
“entirely immaterial” and could be struck under Rule 12(f)—but not because 
they were irrelevant to the merits.34 Instead, the court reasoned that the 
 
26 Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 890-91 (2d Cir. 1976). 
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Id.; see also Brief for Defendants–Appellees: Iota Industries, Inc. & Commonwealth United 
Music, Inc. at 35, Lipsky, 551 F.2d 887 (No. 76-7125) (showing that the plaintiff relied not only on 
certain factual allegations from an SEC complaint, but also on the SEC’s ultimate allegation of 
liability—that Commonwealth’s filings were “subject to objection” under the securities laws for its 
omission of material facts (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
30 Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 891. Commonwealth ultimately settled the SEC enforcement action and 
agreed to the entry of a consent order, id. at 893, although the plaintiff did not attach the consent 
order to the complaint. Brief for Defendants–Appellees, supra note 29. 
31 See Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 894 n.9 (acknowledging that the other filings involved different 
blocks of the same common stock). 
32 Id. at 892.  
33 Id. at 894, 899.  
34 Id. at 893. Although the SEC enforcement action involved other Commonwealth filings 
that were not the subject of any agreement between the parties, those filings pertained to the same 
common stock held by the plaintiff. Id. at 894 n.9. Thus, the plaintiff ’s allegations were relevant 
because, if the SEC found those filings to be deficient, then Commonwealth might have engaged 
in a pattern of willful misconduct. See id. (“[Commonwealth] was registering different blocks of its 
same common stock and the district court could find that [Commonwealth’s] actions as to one 
block shed light on [its] intentions as to another block of stock.”). 
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allegations were immaterial because the SEC complaint and consent order 
would be inadmissible at trial.35 The court reasoned as follows: First, 
motions to strike on grounds of immateriality should be rejected unless no 
evidence in support of the allegations would be admissible.36 Second, since 
consent orders and complaints contain only unadjudicated findings of fact 
and law, they are equivalent to pleas of nolo contendere.37 Therefore, under 
Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, they are inadmissible to prove 
liability in subsequent litigation against the defendant.38 Because the SEC 
complaint and consent order were not admissible at trial, they could have 
“no possible bearing” on the plaintiff ’s action.39 Accordingly, the court held 
that “neither a complaint nor references to a complaint which results in a 
consent judgment may properly be cited in the pleadings under the facts of 
this case.”40  
The immediate effect of the decision on the plaintiff ’s complaint was 
unclear. The decision affirmed the district court’s order, which struck not 
only the attached SEC complaint, but also all references to the SEC’s 
opinions regarding Commonwealth’s various securities filings.41 The court 
granted the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to “particularize the 
alleged inadequacies of the [filings involving the plaintiff ’s own securities], 
omitting any references to the [SEC’s] complaint.”42 But the court also 
acknowledged that deficiencies in other, similar Commonwealth filings 
might be relevant and admissible at trial because they suggested a pattern of 
intentional misconduct.43 Thus, the court’s order raised a question: Could 
the plaintiff rely on factual information derived from the SEC complaint to 
allege a pattern of intentional misconduct by Commonwealth? The court 
did not answer that question directly.  
Given this ambiguity, the Lipsky decision can be read narrowly or broad-
ly. Under a broad interpretation, Lipsky bars plaintiffs from alleging even 
the substance of facts derived from an inadmissible consent order. For 
example, the plaintiff in Lipsky could not allege that Commonwealth’s other, 
similar securities filings omitted certain material facts because such allega-
tions would be based on inadmissible statements from an SEC complaint. 
 
35 Id. at 893-94.  
36 Id. at 893.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 893-94 (discussing FED. R. EVID. 410(a)(2)).  
39 Id. at 894.  
40 Id. at 893.  
41 Id. at 894.  
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 894 n.9.  
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Under a narrow interpretation, Lipsky holds that plaintiffs may not attach or 
refer to a consent order for purposes that would be inadmissible at trial. 
Applying this narrow rule, the plaintiff in Lipsky would have been permitted 
to allege, based at least in part on information learned from the SEC 
complaint, that Commonwealth’s securities filings in other contexts had 
omitted certain material facts and that these omissions may have violated 
the securities laws. But the plaintiff could not, for example, have cited the 
consent order to allege that Commonwealth had settled SEC claims because 
the consent order would be inadmissible at trial for that purpose.44 Today, 
lower courts have split along these lines in evaluating motions to strike 
allegations based on consent orders.  
B. Lipsky in the Lower Courts 
Courts disagree about the extent to which plaintiffs may refer to or rely 
on consent orders in pleadings. Several courts cite Lipsky for the broad 
proposition that any allegation referring to a consent order or other unadju-
dicated finding is per se immaterial under Rule 12(f).45 Some courts have 
even extended this rule by striking those allegations that appear to be 
derived from a consent order but do not expressly refer to one.46 A notable 
example is the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois’s opinion 
in In re Rough Rice Commodity Litigation.47 Although the court was not faced 
with a Rule 12(f) motion to strike, it recognized that the complaint “sub-
stantially recited factual findings taken from a CFTC [consent] order,” even 
though the complaint never expressly referred to the order.48 The court held 
that allegations derived from the CFTC consent order were insufficient to 
 
44 See FED. R. EVID. 410(a).  
45 See, e.g., In re Platinum & Palladium Commodities Litig., 828 F. Supp. 2d 588, 593-94 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (reasoning that allegations that “simply recast the CFTC’s findings” regarding a 
manipulative trading scheme are “paradigms of the type of pleading prohibited by Lipsky and its 
progeny”); Footbridge Ltd. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 09-4050, 2010 WL 3790810, at 
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2010) (striking allegations that were based on pleadings and settlements 
from private actions and government investigations against the defendants); Shahzad v. H.J. 
Meyers & Co., No. 95-6196, 1997 WL 47817, at *13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1997) (striking references 
to seven consent orders with securities regulators).  
46 See Dent v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, No. 08-1533, 2008 WL 2483288, at *2-4 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 
2008) (striking allegations of a “legacy” of racial discrimination where the court found that the 
allegations were derived from a New York Attorney General investigation and other “unproved 
allegations of misconduct” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).  
47 No. 11-618, 2012 WL 473091 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2012).  
48 Id. at *4. As discussed above, the complaint did in fact quote the CFTC order. See supra 
notes 9-11 and accompanying text.  
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state a market-manipulation claim and dismissed the complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6).49  
Even among courts adopting the broad interpretation of Lipsky, many 
have permitted limited references to consent decrees for purposes that 
would be admissible at trial. For example, consent orders may be admissible 
for the purpose of proving knowledge of a legal obligation.50 Where an 
allegation refers to a consent decree for an admissible purpose, Lipsky’s 
reasoning suggests that courts should refrain from striking the allegation as 
immaterial.51 But some courts have limited the reach of this exception by 
arguing that substantive facts derived from consent orders are inadmissible 
because plaintiffs use them to allege “the truth of the matters that led to the 
settlement agreement.”52  
Other courts, however, have adopted a narrow interpretation of Lipsky. 
These courts hold that neither Rule 12(f) nor Lipsky precludes plaintiffs 
from alleging facts derived from a consent order, regardless of whether the 
consent order itself is admissible.53 For example, the District Court for the 
 
49 In re Rough Rice, 2012 WL 473091, at *5.  
50 See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 668 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the district 
court correctly “admitted into evidence an earlier SEC civil consent decree” because it showed 
that the defendant “knew of the SEC reporting requirements involved in the decree”); see also 
Mills v. United Producers, Inc., No. 11-13148, 2012 WL 1672948, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 14, 2012) 
(rejecting a motion to strike reference to a Department of Agriculture consent order because “any 
statement by a party may be offered against him by an opponent” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
51 See Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that 
a motion to strike on immateriality grounds may not be granted unless it is shown that “no 
evidence in support of the allegation would be admissible”).  
52 Dent v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, No. 08-1533, 2008 WL 2483288, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 
2008). The Dent court misperceived the nature of the plaintiff ’s factual allegations that were based 
on a consent order. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had a legacy of racial discrimination, 
which was exposed in a public consent order. Id. The plaintiff did not, as the court believed, allege 
the truth of the matters asserted in the consent order, nor did he allege that the consent order was 
evidence of the truth of past racial discrimination. Id. Rather, the allegations conveyed that the 
plaintiff had reason to believe the allegations were true and that the consent order was the source of 
his belief. Id. at *1. No more is required at the pleadings stage. See Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. 
Media, Inc., No. 09-2227, 2013 WL 1746062, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2013) (“Because a plaintiff 
need not plead specific, admissible evidence in support of a claim, [the plaintiff ] is entitled to 
include allegations based on hearsay.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Connetics Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 541 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“Plaintiffs are undoubtedly correct that 
pleadings need not contain admissible evidence. The Court therefore agrees with plaintiffs that 
there is no basis to strike on evidentiary grounds.” (citation omitted)).  
53 See, e.g., VNB Realty, Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 11-6805, 2013 WL 5179197, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2013) (“A close reading of Lipsky reveals that it does not mandate the 
elimination of material from a complaint simply because the material is copied from another 
complaint.”); In re Bear Stearns Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 746, 768 
n.24 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (refusing to extend Lipsky to disregard or strike allegations derived from 
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Southern District of New York in In re Fannie Mae 2008 Securities Litigation 
considered whether to strike allegations in a securities class action com-
plaint that “closely track[ed]” an SEC complaint.54 Although the SEC 
complaint itself was not admissible, the court reasoned that evidence 
supporting the allegations derived from the SEC complaint was.55 Thus, the 
court held that Lipsky did not require the allegations to be struck.56 As 
shown by this case and others cited above, courts are sharply divided in 
their application of Lipsky. This division is particularly pronounced in the 
Second Circuit where Lipsky controls.57  
C. Rejecting the Broad Application of Lipsky 
It is possible, if ultimately unpersuasive, to interpret Lipsky broadly to 
prohibit any reliance on a consent order in a pleading. The text of the 
court’s holding appears applicable to most allegations that rely on a consent 
order: “[N]either a complaint nor references to a complaint which results in 
a consent judgment may properly be cited in the pleadings under the facts 
of this case.”58 The court did not expressly permit the plaintiff to allege 
deficiencies in other Commonwealth filings that were the basis of the SEC 
enforcement action (although the court noted that such allegations might be 
relevant and ultimately admissible).59 Also, a broad reading of the decision 
may be necessary to give it effect. If Lipsky does not apply broadly, then 
 
third-party civil complaints); SEC v. Lee, 720 F. Supp. 2d 305, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[T]here is 
nothing improper about utilizing information contained in an SEC complaint as evidence to 
support private claims under the [Private Securities Litigation Reform Act].”). 
54 891 F. Supp. 2d 458, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). As discussed in Part II, allegations that “closely 
track” another complaint may raise red flags under Rule 11(b)(3). See infra notes 91-98 and 
accompanying text. But the court in In re Fannie Mae did not consider whether the plaintiffs 
violated Rule 11(b)(3), perhaps because the plaintiffs found additional support for their allegations 
from early discovery and from publicly available information. See 891 F. Supp. 2d at 472.  
55 See id. at 471.  
56 Id. at 471-72. 
57 Compare id. at 471 (“Lipsky does not . . . stand for the proposition that any factual allegation 
derived from a government investigation or pleading must be stricken . . . .”), with In re Platinum 
& Palladium Commodities Litig., 828 F. Supp. 2d 588, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[A]llegations 
[that] simply recast the CFTC’s findings . . . are paradigms of the type of pleading prohibited by 
Lipsky and its progeny.”).  
58 Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976). Courts citing 
this language in support of the broad reading sometimes omit the qualifying text “under the facts 
of this case.” See, e.g., In re Platinum & Palladium, 828 F. Supp. 2d at 593.  
59 See Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 894 (“We agree that the SEC’s opinion on the sufficiency of the 
various statements may be relevant and . . . admissible. But we do not agree that it necessarily 
follows that its complaint is appropriately within the pleadings.” (footnote omitted)).  
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plaintiffs could circumvent its holding by omitting any mention of a consent 
order even as they copy allegations from one.60  
But neither the Lipsky decision itself nor Rule 12(f) and pleadings law 
support this outcome. The court’s analysis in Lipsky restricts the decision to 
the narrow circumstances in which plaintiffs rely on consent orders for 
purposes that would be inadmissible at trial. Moreover, the broad reading 
ignores or misperceives the requirements of Rules 12(f) and 11(b)(3), under 
which courts examine the relevance of the allegations, the potential availa-
bility of supporting admissible evidence, and the prejudice associated with 
granting or denying a motion to strike. These inquiries will generally favor 
plaintiffs who rely on consent orders to allege facts that they believe to be 
true and that they anticipate supporting with admissible evidence at the 
trial stage.  
1. A Close Reading of Lipsky 
The Lipsky court likely did not intend the decision to have an extensive 
scope. Despite its broadly worded holding, the court expressed that the 
decision was limited to the facts of the case,61 so that future plaintiffs might 
distinguish their reliance on consent orders. It further noted that “ordinarily 
neither a district court nor an appellate court should decide to strike a 
portion of the complaint—on the grounds that the material could not 
possibly be relevant—on the sterile field of the pleadings alone.”62 Finally, 
the court cautioned against “tamper[ing] with the pleadings” because 
pleadings law and policy had “long departed from the era . . . when lawsuits 
were won or lost on the pleadings alone.”63  
Pleading standards have changed dramatically since the Lipsky decision. 
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly64 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,65 the Supreme Court 
“discarded the liberal, notice-pleading paradigm . . . in favor of a new 
paradigm of plausibility pleading.”66 Since plaintiffs today must show that 
their allegations of liability are plausible, they may need to rely on facts 
from consent orders to provide essential information that is not otherwise 
 
60 Indeed, the plaintiffs in Rough Rice attempted such an approach but were stopped by a 
court citing Lipsky. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.  
61 See Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 893.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. The court further noted that the plaintiff could still introduce relevant evidence of the 
SEC’s opinion at trial, although he could not introduce the SEC complaint or consent order. Id. at 
894.  
64 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
65 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
66 Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1310 (2010).  
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available at the pleading stage. As a result, the equities associated with 
motions to strike may have shifted in plaintiffs’ favor.67 The shift in equities 
is even greater in securities fraud class actions, where plaintiffs frequently 
rely on SEC complaints, because the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act (PSLRA) imposed heightened pleading requirements years after the 
Lipsky decision.68  
A broad application of Lipsky would also improperly require courts to 
strike allegations that are potentially backed by admissible evidence. The 
Lipsky court observed that a Rule 12(f) motion on immateriality grounds 
should be rejected unless no evidence in support of the allegations would be 
admissible.69 It further warned of the dangers involved in resolving eviden-
tiary or relevance questions during the pleadings stage and in “tamper[ing] 
with the pleadings” in general.70 Furthermore, the court noted that the 
substance of allegations derived from the SEC complaint might be relevant 
to the merits of the plaintiff ’s action and even potentially admissible at 
trial.71 By its own analysis, the court appeared to indicate that Rule 12(f) 
protected such allegations through its relevance and admissibility inquiries. 
At a minimum, Lipsky is ambiguous, and subsequent courts should interpret 
it in light of the developments in Rule 12(f) law and other pleadings law and 
policy. 
2. Rule 12(f) and Pleadings Law and Policy 
Rule 12(f) case law does not support a broad reading of Lipsky. As men-
tioned above, under Rule 12(f), a court may strike any “redundant, immate-
rial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”72 Courts have generally interpreted 
this rule to require the moving party to show the following: (1) there is no 
available admissible evidence in support of the allegations; (2) the allega-
tions are irrelevant; and (3) the moving party would be prejudiced if the 
allegations were permitted to stand.73  
 
67 See id. at 1314-16 (noting that Twombly and Iqbal heightened pleading standards by disre-
garding conclusory allegations and examining whether the remaining allegations plausibly 
suggested entitlement to relief ).  
68 See Richard Casey & Jared Fields, Piggybacking Through the Pleading Standards: Reliance on 
Third-Party Investigative Materials to Satisfy Particularity Requirements in Securities Class Actions, SEC. 
LITIG. REP., June 2010, at 11, 13 (“Some members of the plaintiffs’ bar complain that it is now 
more difficult to plead a securities fraud case than it is to prove one at trial.”).  
69 See Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976).  
70 Id. According to the court, “Evidentiary questions . . . should especially be avoided at [the 
pleadings] stage.” Id.  
71 Id. at 894.  
72 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f ). 
73 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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The broad reading of Lipsky is inconsistent with the first admissibility 
inquiry because it would improperly require courts to strike factual allega-
tions that would likely have evidentiary support at the trial stage. At the 
pleadings stage, plaintiffs have to meet only this low evidentiary burden.74 
Appropriately, courts have now recognized that the broad reading of Lipsky 
conflates the admissibility of the consent order itself and the admissibility 
of evidence supporting the allegations derived from the consent order.75 
While the consent order itself may be inadmissible at trial to prove the 
validity of a disputed claim or fact,76 plaintiffs at the pleadings stage are not 
required to prove the validity of the facts they allege.77 Rather, they only 
need to allege that they believe the facts are true and that they will likely be 
able to locate admissible evidence to support the allegations at the trial 
stage—an outcome that is probable when plaintiffs rely on a consent order 
dealing with the same defendants and issues.78  
 
74 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (requiring that “factual contentions [in pleadings] have evi-
dentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery”); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (explaining that the plausibility pleading standard “simply 
calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of 
illegal [conduct]”).  
75 See, e.g., Marvin H. Maurras Revocable Trust v. Bronfman, Nos. 12-3395, 12-6019, 2013 
WL 5348357, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2013) (rejecting a motion to strike allegation that “could be 
proved by evidence other than the inadmissible Minnesota Attorney General complaint and 
consent decree”); In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig., 891 F. Supp. 2d 458, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(“[W]hile the SEC complaint and the [Non-Prosecution Agreement] are not admissible, there is 
evidence in support of the factual allegations contained within these documents that would be 
admissible.”); cf. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 530 (2008) (“Although Federal Rule of Evidence 410 
precludes the admission of a nolo contendere plea, the underlying facts are not insulated from 
admissibility . . . .”).  
76 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408(a)(1) (excluding evidence against either party of a compromise 
offer or negotiation that is offered to prove or disprove the validity of a disputed claim); FED. R. 
EVID. 410(a)(2) (excluding evidence of a nolo contendere plea against a defendant who made the 
plea or participated in plea discussions).  
77 But see Dent v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, No. 08-1533, 2008 WL 2483288, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 
17, 2008) (striking allegations based on a consent order because the plaintiff relied on the order to 
allege “the truth of the matters that led to the settlement agreement”). The Dent court’s analysis 
exemplifies the confusion among the lower courts regarding whether plaintiffs relying on consent 
orders are necessarily alleging the truth of a fact. See supra note 52.  
78 See Berke v. Presstek, Inc., 188 F.R.D. 179, 181 (D.N.H. 1998) (“[T]he question properly 
posed is whether references in the complaint to the SEC’s consent decrees have any bearing on 
issues in this suit—not whether the allegations and exhibits attached to the complaint are, or 
might be, competent evidence if offered at trial.”); see also SEC v. Lee, 720 F. Supp. 2d 305, 341 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[R]eliance on the SEC and CFTC allegations does not demonstrate that [the 
complaint] lacks evidentiary support, but rather provides it with the necessary evidentiary 
support.”). It is also tempting to criticize the Lipsky court for raising evidentiary questions at all 
during the pleadings stage. But this criticism is more accurately directed toward Rule 12(f ) law 
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In addition to Rule 12(f) case law, pleadings policy weighs in favor of a 
narrow reading of Lipsky. Under a broad reading, courts would be obligated 
to strike all allegations derived from a consent order, but they would not be 
required to strike those same allegations had they been derived from a 
newspaper or other “unadjudicated” source.79 In contrast, a narrow reading 
of Lipsky would avoid such arbitrary dispositions of Rule 12(f) motions. 
As to Rule 12(f)’s prejudice inquiry, it is difficult to see how defendants 
will invariably be prejudiced if plaintiffs rely on the substance of a consent 
decree; defendants have already presumably faced a government investiga-
tion involving similar facts and issues.80 Although defendants may find a 
broad Lipsky rule helpful for winning motions to dismiss,81 the Lipsky court 
certainly did not purport to shift the balance of power between plaintiffs 
and defendants at the pleadings stage.82  
Finally, a narrow interpretation will help give Rule 11(b)(3) effect by 
enabling plaintiffs to identify consent orders as a source of information that 
leads them to believe their allegations will likely be supported by admissible 
evidence. Plaintiffs would be unable to comply with that provision if Lipsky 
were read to prevent all references to consent orders.  
For these reasons, a narrow application of Lipsky is the best interpreta-
tion of the decision, Rules 12(f) and 11(b)(3), and pleadings policy generally. 
What is left of Lipsky if courts adopt a narrow reading of it? As mentioned 
 
generally, which asks courts to consider the availability of admissible evidence in support of the 
allegations.  
79 See In re Bear Stearns Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 746, 768 
n.24 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“It makes little sense to say that information[,] . . . which the [plaintiff ] 
could unquestionably rely on if it were mentioned in a news clipping or public testimony[,] is 
immaterial simply because it is conveyed in an unadjudicated complaint.”); see also Brief of 
Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Shareholders & Consumer Attorneys in Support of Neither 
Party at 15-17, U.S. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5227) 
[hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Shareholders & Consumer Attorneys] 
(describing other unadjudicated sources that courts have held may be cited in pleadings). A broad 
reading might even preclude plaintiffs from relying on relevant findings from a consent order 
involving different parties, although courts have rejected this theory so far. See, e.g., Hyland v. 
Homeservices of Am., Inc., 2007-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 75,794, at 108,430 (W.D. Ky. June 28, 
2007) (refusing to extend Lipsky to strike references to a state regulatory consent decree where no 
defendants in the private lawsuit were parties to the consent decree); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
National Ass’n of Shareholders & Consumer Attorneys, supra, at 27 (“[A]t a minimum, Lipsky 
should not be read to bar the citation of complaints or consent decrees in allegations against 
different defendants.”). 
80 See In re Fannie Mae, 891 F. Supp. 2d at 472 (finding that allegations derived from an SEC 
complaint did not prejudice the defendants because they faced the same allegations in the SEC 
enforcement action).  
81 See Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 1373-74 (discussing cases where the courts have held that 
settlements with regulators “cannot be used to support plaintiff ’s allegations in civil litigation”).  
82 See Lipsky, 551 F.2d at 893 (“[C]ourts should not tamper with the pleadings unless there is 
a strong reason for so doing.”).  
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above, the narrow reading permits plaintiffs to rely on a consent order for 
substantive allegations to establish a claim of liability and to identify the 
consent order as the source of their information. But under Lipsky, courts 
may strike as immaterial any allegations based on consent orders for pur-
poses that would be inadmissible at trial. These inadmissible purposes 
might include asserting that the defendant was more likely to have commit-
ted illegal conduct because he entered into a consent order. As Lipsky 
directed, courts must “prun[e] [complaints] with care”83 because the distinc-
tion between proper and improper references to consent orders can be 
subtle.  
At first blush, this result may seem unsatisfactory because it permits 
plaintiffs to rely extensively on consent orders, despite the rather broad 
language of Lipsky’s holding. However, the narrow reading will not neces-
sarily open the floodgates to “copy-and-paste” pleadings. Some causes of 
action with heightened pleading standards may not be pleaded solely 
through allegations derived from consent orders.84 And Rule 11(b)(3) still 
governs attorneys who seek to rely on consent orders in their pleadings. 
II. RELIANCE ON CONSENT ORDERS AND RULE 11(b)(3) 
The analysis above argues that Rule 12(f) and Lipsky do not prohibit 
plaintiffs from relying on consent orders to allege facts in a complaint. 
What if, however, an attorney relies only on a consent order to allege a 
claim? To answer that question, courts have looked to Rule 11(b)(3). Under 
Rule 11(b)(3), an attorney filing a pleading “certifies that to the best of [his] 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable 
under the circumstances[,] . . . the factual contentions have evidentiary 
support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support 
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”85 As 
Section II.A explains, several courts have held that plaintiffs cannot meet 
their Rule 11(b)(3) burden by relying on a consent order alone. But these 
cases do not stand for the proposition that Rule 11(b)(3) bars any reliance on 
a consent order at the pleadings stage. As Section II.B shows, Rule 11(b)(3) 
 
83 Id.at 894.  
84 For example, to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs may not plead the circumstances constituting fraud based on 
information and belief unless certain conditions are met. See Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree 
Med. Benefits Trust v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 442-43 (7th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that 
plaintiffs can only plead fraud based on information and belief if the facts are inaccessible to the 
plaintiff and the plaintiff has grounds for suspicion).  
85 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).  
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permits some reliance on a consent order in a prefiling investigation, subject 
to certain factors that courts use to police that reliance.  
A. The Duty of Independent Investigation 
 Rule 11(b) imposes an affirmative duty on the attorney signing the 
pleading to determine that it is factually and legally warranted.86 The duty 
is nondelegable; a signing attorney must personally apply his own judg-
ment,87 although the attorney may rely on the veracity of information 
acquired from others, such as witnesses or even other attorneys.88 But 
absent compelling circumstances, attorneys must conduct a reasonable, 
personal inquiry into the merits of a case and may not rely solely on the 
representations of other attorneys to plead a cause of action.89 Broadly 
stated, the attorney’s duty of independent investigation is to “stop and 
think” before filing.90  
 
86 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2)–(3); see also Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 
120, 125 (1989) (explaining that, by signing a filing with the court, an attorney represents that the 
filing is “factually and legally responsible”). 
87 See Pavelic, 493 U.S. at 125. 
88 See Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1278-79 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that 
Rule 11’s requirements do not prohibit attorneys from relying on information from others). 
89 See id. at 1280 (finding a clear Rule 11 violation where two attorneys “abdicated their own 
responsibilities and relied excessively on [another attorney]”).  
90 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 20, § 1334. In the Ninth Circuit, a lawyer may be sanc-
tioned for a Rule 11(b) violation only if his claim is both baseless and made without reasonable 
investigation. See Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990). 
This decision permits plaintiffs to rely on allegations from consent orders if the claim ultimately 
has some merit, even if the plaintiffs did not attempt to investigate those allegations. The Third 
Circuit in Garr rejected the proposition that Rule 11(b) permits this “shot in the dark” pleading. 
See Garr, 22 F.3d at 1279 (“[A] signer making an inadequate inquiry into the sufficiency of the 
facts and law underlying a document will not be saved from a Rule 11 sanction by the stroke of 
luck that the document happened to be justified.”). This Section does not seek to resolve the 
circuit split, because at issue here is whether courts should strike allegations from pleadings under 
Rule 11(b), not the application of sanctions. Faced with motions to strike, even district courts in 
the Ninth Circuit seem to agree that plaintiffs must comply with the duty of independent 
investigation, regardless of whether the claim appears to have some merit. See, e.g., Fraker v. 
Bayer Corp., No. 08-1564, 2009 WL 5865687, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2009) (striking references 
to a Federal Trade Commission consent decree where the complaint alleged no other facts 
indicating that the plaintiffs conducted an independent investigation); In re Connetics Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 542 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1005-06 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (striking references to an SEC complaint 
where plaintiffs did not independently investigate specific allegations drawn from the complaint). 
Moreover, even if the claim is baseless, courts in the Ninth Circuit must still determine whether 
the attorney complied with the duty of independent investigation. See Townsend, 929 F.2d at 1362 
(holding that a filing must be baseless and made without reasonable investigation in order for a 
court to impose Rule 11(b) sanctions). Therefore, the analysis in this Section is relevant in the 
Ninth Circuit as well.  
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Courts have argued persuasively that attorneys cannot satisfy their duty 
of independent investigation by blindly relying on a consent order to plead 
an entire claim or element of a claim.91 In Geinko v. Padda, the plaintiffs 
attempted to cure their pleading deficiencies for a securities fraud claim by 
attaching third-party filings in addition to an SEC complaint.92 The 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found that the plaintiffs 
did not satisfy their Rule 11(b)(3) duty when they merely stated, “the SEC 
alleges certain additional facts.”93 Moreover, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
argument that they could not have investigated the attached materials 
because they lacked the resources of the SEC or of class action attorneys.94 
The court’s analysis is consistent with the letter and spirit of Rule 11(b)(3), 
which requires attorneys to conduct an independent investigation even if 
they duplicate another attorney’s efforts.95  
However, the duty of independent investigation does not prohibit all 
forms of reliance on consent orders. The cases cited above indicate that, 
absent compelling circumstances, a consent order cannot be the only source 
of information used by an attorney to investigate a claim.96 Some district 
courts have moved cautiously before determining that a consent order was 
the attorney’s sole source in investigating the claim. For example, district 
courts in the Ninth Circuit have suggested that a court should strike 
allegations derived from a consent order only after scouring the complaint 
for any independent factual support and finding none.97 The Ninth Circuit’s 
approach acknowledges that an attorney has complied with his duty of 
 
91 See In re Connetics Corp., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1005 (holding that “an attorney may [not] rely 
entirely on another complaint as the sole basis for his or her allegations”). 
92 [2001–2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 91,711, at 98,261 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 
26, 2002).  
93 Id. at 98,265 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
94 See id. at 98,265 n.10.  
95 See Garr, 22 F.3d at 1280 (“The advantage of duplicate personal inquiries is manifest: while 
one attorney might find a complaint well founded . . . , another, even after examining the materials 
available to the first attorney, could come to a contrary conclusion.”).  
96 See Fraker v. Bayer Corp., No. 08-1564, 2009 WL 5865687, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2009) 
(“[W]hile [the complaint] may refer to allegations set forth in a complaint in a different action, [it] 
may not ‘rely entirely on another complaint.’” (citing In re Connetics Corp., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 
1005)); see also In re Connetics Corp., 542 F. Supp. 2d at 1005 (“[T]he SEC complaint appears to be 
the only basis for the allegations against defendants . . . .”).  
97 See, e.g., Fraker, 2009 WL 5865687, at *5 (analyzing the complaint and concluding, after 
“stripping” the derived allegations from the complaint, that there was “no independently acquired 
evidence that would tend to support” the plaintiff ’s legal contentions); In re Connetics Corp., 542 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1005 (“Although plaintiffs contend that the SEC complaint is one of many bases for 
plaintiffs’ complaint, they do not contend that they . . . had any additional bases for the specific 
allegations pertaining to [the defendants].”). 
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independent investigation when he has verified the substance of an allega-
tion derived from a consent order.98  
Thus, courts have addressed the outer limits of the duty of independent 
investigation. An attorney does not satisfy the duty when he fails to person-
ally investigate any of the allegations derived from a consent order. In 
contrast, an attorney satisfies this duty when he locates independent support 
for every such allegation. Between these two poles, the analysis is less clear. 
What if an attorney attempts to verify the substance of allegations from a 
consent order but is unable to locate any relevant information? What if the 
attorney needs to rely on a consent order to provide context but not to 
establish an entire element or claim?  
Rule 11(b)(3) permits courts to evaluate these questions on a case-by-case 
basis. Following the Rule, an attorney need not locate support for every 
allegation; he may plead on information and belief so long as the allegations 
“will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for 
further investigation or discovery.”99 Although the attorney generally must 
attempt some independent investigation, the attorney needs to conduct only 
an inquiry that is reasonable under the circumstances.100 Moreover, the duty 
of independent investigation does not require the attorney to individually 
confirm each allegation.101 Rather, the attorney must “stop and think” before 
filing the complaint, which may entail seeking other factual support, 
considering the credibility of second-hand information, and evaluating 
competing interpretations.102 This analysis suggests that courts have broad 
 
98 See De La Fuente v. DCI Telecomms., Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 250, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(holding that the plaintiff properly utilized information from SEC complaints when his counsel 
certified that “every allegation in the complaint was verified . . . through independent investiga-
tion”).  
99 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3); cf. Kiobel v. Millson, 592 F.3d 78, 81 (2d Cir. 2010) (“A state-
ment of fact can give rise to the imposition of sanctions only when the ‘particular allegation is 
utterly lacking in support.’” (citing Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370, 388 (2d Cir. 
2003))).  
100 See Garr, 22 F.3d at 1278-79 (clarifying that “the standard under Rule 11 is fact specific” 
and “the court must consider all the material circumstances in evaluating the signer’s conduct” 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Courts have considered a variety of factors that 
may reasonably affect the scope of an attorney’s investigation, including the complexity of the 
issues involved and the difficulty of obtaining information within the control of an adverse party. 
See generally 1 RONALD E. MALLEN ET AL., LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 11:7 (2013 ed.) (citing cases 
where courts have considered “the extent of research and investigation that was practical” and “the 
complexity of the factual and legal issues”).  
101 See Garr, 22 F.3d at 1280 (suggesting that reliance on information gathered by other per-
sons is acceptable so long as the attorney does not evade his obligation to personally inquire into 
the allegations); In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 
2011) (permitting reliance on “detailed notes and memoranda” prepared by investigators).  
102 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 20, at § 1334 (discussing how the 1993 amendment to 
Rule 11(b) did not alter attorneys’ obligation to “stop and think” before submitting a filing).  
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discretion to permit reliance on consent orders in pleadings depending on 
the circumstances of a case. Fortunately, courts have identified several 
factors that help to police reliance on consent orders.  
B. Policing Factors to Ensure Adequate Investigation 
Courts have applied at least three procedural requirements to give effect 
to Rule 11(b)(3) when plaintiffs rely on consent orders. First, some courts 
require plaintiffs to identify allegations derived from consent orders. 
Although this notice requirement could be cumbersome in practice, courts 
have permitted plaintiffs to provide more general notice in complex and 
lengthy pleadings. Second, some courts evaluate the reliability of infor-
mation derived from consent orders. According to these courts, Rule 
11(b)(3) should not bar plaintiffs from using the often probative information 
found in consent orders. Third, some courts require that plaintiffs attempt 
in good faith to verify information derived from consent orders. This 
requirement advances Rule 11’s policy objectives of improving the quality of 
pleadings and the thoroughness of prefiling investigations. Together, these 
three factors provide a starting point—though not an exhaustive test—for 
courts to ensure that plaintiffs have complied with the duty of independent 
investigation.  
1. Notice 
Courts may require notice that the plaintiff has relied on a consent or-
der. In In re Spiegel, Inc. Securities Litigation, the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois permitted the plaintiffs to allege facts derived 
from an independent examiner’s report prepared pursuant to an SEC 
settlement.103 Since the report was quite extensive, the court ordered the 
plaintiffs to amend their complaint to identify allegations derived from the 
examiner’s report.104 The court agreed with the defendants that such 
amendments were necessary to enable the court to exercise its “gatekeeping 
role” in evaluating whether the plaintiffs had a reasonable basis for allegations 
made on information and belief.105 Although Spiegel involved the require-
ments under the PSLRA, its reasoning also applies to Rule 11(b)(3) inquir-
ies, since Rule 11(b)(3) requires plaintiffs to “specifically” identify which 
 
103 382 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1013-14 (N.D. Ill. 2004).  
104 Id. 
105 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Spiegel involved securities fraud claims governed 
by the PSLRA, which requires plaintiffs to state with particularity all facts on which an allegation 
made on information and belief is based. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006). 
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allegations will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportuni-
ty for further investigation or discovery. For example, the court in Geinko v. 
Padda held that the plaintiffs violated Rule 11(b)(3) because they failed to 
specifically identify which alleged facts resulted from their own investiga-
tion and which they “merely [asserted] that someone else ha[d] alleged.”106  
A notice requirement introduces practical challenges for plaintiffs and 
courts. For instance, should plaintiffs be required to identify every allega-
tion for which they relied on a consent order, even to a trivial extent? As 
with other Rule 11(b) inquiries,107 courts have adopted a flexible approach 
that varies with the circumstances. The Spiegel court required the plaintiffs 
to identify each and every allegation that was based on the independent 
examiner’s report because the PSLRA required that level of detail.108 But 
even for claims without a statutory particularity requirement, Rule 11(b)(3) 
might require greater specificity in cases involving exceedingly long or 
complex complaints.109 In contrast, courts have generally permitted plain-
tiffs to identify whether they relied on a consent order as part of a mix of 
sources where it would be impractical to identify every instance of reli-
ance.110 Although these cases may provide insufficient guidance, plaintiffs 
can err on the side of caution by providing as much specificity as possible 
under the circumstances.  
Moreover, Rule 12(f) and Lipsky would not require courts to strike alle-
gations that refer to consent orders as sources of information if Rule 12(f) 
and Lipsky are read narrowly as part of a comprehensive pleadings scheme. 
Under Rule 11(b)(3), courts may require plaintiffs to identify the sources of 
allegations made on information and belief. By identifying consent orders as 
a source of information, plaintiffs indicate they believe that the allegations 
are true and that admissible evidence will likely be available through 
discovery. This outcome is appropriate under Rule 12(f) and Lipsky.  
2. Reliability 
Courts also evaluate the reliability of information derived from a con-
sent order. This information, some commentators assert, is inherently 
suspicious. Richard Casey and Jared Fields—both practicing defense 
 
106 [2001–2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 91,711, at 98,265 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 
26, 2002). 
107 See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.  
108 See In re Spiegel, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1013-14.  
109 For example, the complaint in Spiegel included 216 pages and 477 paragraphs. Id. at 1014. 
110 See, e.g., In re Livent, Inc. Sec. Litig., 78 F. Supp. 2d 194, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding 
that the plaintiff provided sufficient notice by identifying an SEC complaint as one source among 
others in the complaint).  
  
442 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 421 
 
lawyers—note that an examiner’s report, such as the one at issue in Spiegel, 
may be a “fishing expedition”111 designed to “conjure claims on behalf of the 
bankruptcy estate.”112 The authors also observe that administrative agencies 
are not neutral parties in the context of an enforcement action, although 
they do not doubt agencies’ good faith.113 Other commentators, often 
members of the defense bar, have attacked the SEC for deploying broadly 
worded settlement documents with relaxed evidentiary standards, often 
with the goal of creating new legal precedent.114 Some courts even have 
raised concerns that allegations in consent orders are less reliable because 
they are unadjudicated.115 Given these concerns, should plaintiffs approach 
consent orders with skepticism when conducting their prefiling investigation?  
Perhaps, but these cautionary points should not preclude reliance on 
consent orders under Rule 11(b)(3). Factual allegations in consent orders are 
not inherently unreliable or biased. Though some commentators attack the 
 
111 See Casey & Fields, supra note 68, at 15 (quoting In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & 
“ERISA” Litig., No. MDL-1446, 2005 WL 3504860, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2005)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 15-16; see also Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Report of the Task Force on SEC 
Settlements, 47 BUS. LAW. 1083, 1158 (1992) (“[P]ersons may settle proceedings for reasons wholly 
unrelated to the merits of the case and . . . the settlement itself may therefore represent unreliable 
or incomplete findings on which no other consequences should depend.”). The Committee on 
Federal Regulation of Securities includes American Bar Association (ABA) members and 
“significant participation by SEC staff members” in its meetings. ABA, Federal Regulation of 
Securities, ABA BUS. L. SEC., 
http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=CL410000&edit= (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
It is not, therefore, a wholly neutral observer. The Committee’s mission involves providing 
meetings, programs, and information to practitioners on securities laws. Id. The Committee also 
comments on SEC rule proposals and reviews the rules and procedures of the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority. Id.  
114 See Anne C. Flannery, Time for a Change: A Re-examination of the Settlement Policies of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1015, 1017 (1994) (“While a court 
would likely dismiss a case with weak evidence regardless of its importance, the SEC may treat 
evidentiary issues with greater latitude because it has a strong commitment to the principles 
involved in a given case.”); Danné L. Johnson, SEC Settlement: Agency Self-Interest or Public Interest, 
12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 627, 652-58 (2007) (describing settlements in which the SEC 
“created a new legal standard”); Zachary W. Carter, The SEC’s “Settlement-Prudence”: “Law” 
Creation Through a Coercive Settlement Process (Dorsey & Whitney, LLP), June 30, 2004, at 9, 
available at www.lawseminars.com/materials/07SDAMNY/carter.pdf (describing SEC settlements 
as “one-sided imposition[s] of [the SEC’s] unchallenged views on an issue, to which the defend-
ant/target acquiesces without much of a fight”). These commentators, two of whom have served at 
the SEC (Flannery and Johnson), all rely to some extent on the ABA committee’s findings from 
the 1992 Report of the Task Force on SEC Settlements, supra note 113. Flannery, supra, at 1017 n.3; 
Johnson, supra, at 668 n.203; Carter, supra, at 1 n.1. 
115 See In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 10-1735, 2011 WL 5101787, at *10 n.5 (D. Ariz. 
Oct. 27, 2011) (“[B]ecause allegations from other complaints are unproven and contested, they do 
not amount to ‘facts’ sufficient to establish a strong inference of scienter.”).  
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SEC’s broadly worded settlement language, they focus on the SEC’s 
exposition of legal standards rather than the factual allegations that plain-
tiffs rely on in their pleadings.116 Casey and Fields observe that the SEC is 
not a neutral party in enforcement actions, but they concede that the “SEC 
presumably makes allegations in its complaints after investigation and 
with . . . good faith.”117  
Without clear evidence to the contrary, plaintiffs should not be discour-
aged from relying on factual allegations made by an agency that investigated 
a matter within its expertise.118 Some consent orders are “replete with 
detailed factual information of obvious relevance to the case at hand.”119 For 
example, in Spiegel, the Independent Examiner’s Report resulted from an 
investigation involving more than 800,000 documents and 51 witness 
interviews.120 Likewise, in Bear Stearns, the court permitted the plaintiffs to 
cite a detailed study described in a third-party complaint because it provided 
data revealing widespread misconduct by the same defendants.121 According 
to the court, it would be nonsensical to permit the plaintiffs to rely on such 
information if it were contained in a news report but not if it were found in 
a third-party complaint.122 Unlike some news reports and other third-party 
complaints, agency complaints and consent orders often undergo a thorough 
review process involving public officials who do not have a direct financial 
stake in the action’s outcome.123 Finally, although the factual findings of 
 
116 At most, Flannery suggested—in a paragraph discussing the SEC’s efforts to “reform the 
law”—that the SEC “may treat evidentiary issues with greater latitude.” Flannery, supra note 114, 
at 1017.  
117 Casey & Fields, supra note 68, at 16.  
118 See De La Fuente v. DCI Telecomms., Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 250, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(“[I]t would have been irresponsible for plaintiff to have ignored the SEC’s highly relevant 
allegations and findings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae 
National Ass’n of Shareholders & Consumer Attorneys, supra note 79, at 15 (“The conclusions of a 
government agency, reached after a detailed investigation and access to internal corporate 
documents, constitute exactly the sort of ‘secondhand information’ that a plaintiff might reasona-
bly ‘believe[] to be true’ for the purposes of information-and-belief pleading . . . .” (alteration in 
original)).  
119 In re Bear Stearns Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 746, 768 n.24 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also In re New Century, 588 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1221 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (refusing 
to strike allegations drawn from a bankruptcy examiner’s report because the report was extremely 
detailed).  
120 In re Spiegel, Inc. Sec. Litig., 382 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1013 (N.D. Ill. 2004).  
121 851 F. Supp. 2d at 768 n.24.  
122 Id. The potential for arbitrary results applies equally in the Rule 12(f ) and Rule 11 con-
texts. See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of 
Shareholders & Consumer Attorneys, supra note 79, at 10 (listing cases that permit reliance on 
various third-party sources).  
123 For example, the SEC employs a multi-step review process that subjects the Division of 
Enforcement’s recommendations to approval by senior managers, directors of other SEC 
divisions, and ultimately by the independent Commissioners themselves. See OFFICE OF CHIEF 
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consent orders may be unadjudicated, the settlement process remains 
adversarial to some extent, giving defendants an opportunity to influence 
the language of a consent order.124 Thus, there is little reason to treat 
consent orders as inherently suspicious during a prefiling investigation.  
Even if consent orders are not neutral expositions of facts, Rule 11(b)(3) 
does not require plaintiffs to ignore the opinions and factual findings of 
government agencies. Rather, the Rule requires that attorneys evaluate 
whether the findings are sufficiently reliable for use in their complaints. 
The discussion above suggests several indicia of reliability, including the 
level of detail in the consent order, the susceptibility of the particular 
factfindings to distortion, the comprehensiveness of the government’s 
investigation, and the nature of the agency’s expertise relative to the case at 
hand.125 This list is not exhaustive, and the inquiry does not demand 
certainty. Rule 11(b)(3) does not ask plaintiffs to certify that factual allega-
tions are definitely true or that they have found admissible evidence in 
support of these allegations; rather, plaintiffs need to believe only that 
supporting evidence will likely be available after further discovery. When 
relying on consent orders, plaintiffs will usually be able to meet this standard.  
3. Good Faith Attempt at Independent Verification 
In some cases, courts may also require plaintiffs at least to attempt to verify 
facts from a consent order. This requirement addresses courts’ well-grounded 
concern about “bootstrapping” complaints that merely recite unadjudicated 
findings from a consent order without any separate analysis by the filing 
attorney.126 Like the plaintiffs’ attorneys in Garr, who relied solely on the 
 
COUNSEL, SEC DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 25-27 (2013), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf (setting forth the review process 
for Division of Enforcement recommendations); see also Johnson, supra note 114, at 633 (describing 
the “detail-oriented” SEC investigation process, which the author concludes “weed[s] out the 
meritless cases”).  
124 See Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., supra note 113, at 1092 (“The respondent also will 
seek the elimination of any inflammatory language . . . .”).  
125 See supra notes 118-124 and accompanying text; see also MALLEN ET AL., supra note 100, 
§ 11:7; Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Shareholders & Consumer Attorneys, supra note 
79, at 11-12.  
126 See Ledford v. Rapid-American Corp., 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 312, 313 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (dismissing part of a complaint for impermissibly relying on the nonadjudicative 
finding of the New York State Division of Human Rights that there was probable cause to believe 
age discrimination had occurred); cf. In re Platinum & Palladium Commodities Litig., 828 F. 
Supp. 2d 588, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“To the extent the Complaint describes the manipulative 
trading scheme, those allegations simply recast the CFTC’s findings and are derived wholesale 
from the CFTC Order.”).  
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representations of forwarding counsel,127 attorneys who do no more than 
copy and paste allegations from a consent order have failed to attempt to 
conduct an independent investigation. This failure undermines Rule 11’s 
objectives, even when the plaintiff derives allegations from a highly detailed 
and reliable consent order.  
Bootstrapping avoids duplicative but necessary investigations that often 
enhance the quality of pleadings by encouraging attorneys to question legal 
theories and consider alternative interpretations of facts.128 Bootstrapping 
also reduces attorneys’ incentives to conduct any investigation whatsoever,129 
which subverts Rule 11’s long-term goals of elevating professional standards 
and improving the thoroughness of prefiling investigations.130 As a result, 
courts should actively prevent bootstrapping based on consent orders.  
But not all plaintiffs who rely on consent orders are bootstrapping in a 
manner that skirts the duty of independent investigation. When plaintiffs 
use a consent order along with a broader mix of sources, they will generally 
satisfy Rule 11(b)(3), even if they are unable to verify every allegation.131 In 
such cases, reliance on consent orders may enhance the quality of pleadings 
by providing important context and additional factual support for claims. 
Moreover, consent orders may contain information that would otherwise be 
inaccessible to plaintiffs. In these cases, “bootstrapping” may be the only 
way for plaintiffs to bring a meritorious claim.132 Where plaintiffs are 
unable to verify the information, the reliability inquiry helps ensure that 
plaintiffs derive allegations from consent orders that are likely backed by 
admissible evidence.  
 
127 See Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1280 (3d Cir. 1994).  
128 See id. (acknowledging that there is an evident advantage to “duplicate personal inquiries”).  
129 The Geinko court warned of a “pleading loophole” if litigants were permitted to cite third-
party complaints. Geinko v. Padda, [2001–2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
91,711, at 98,265 n.8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2002). Through this loophole, two plaintiffs could file 
separate actions and rely on each other’s complaints for the substance of their allegations. Id. This 
potential abuse is less concerning in the context of relying on consent orders, assuming govern-
ment agencies, unlike plaintiffs’ lawyers, are generally unwilling to cooperate with other litigants 
in this manner.  
130 See Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 607 (1998) 
(“Imposing sanctions when a paper is well-grounded, but when the attorney failed to investigate, 
is an example of regulating the new professionalism standard.”).  
131 See, e.g., In re Cylink Sec. Litig., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (permitting 
the plaintiffs to rely on an SEC complaint that supplemented the plaintiffs’ independently 
investigated allegations regarding scienter). 
132 See Casey & Fields, supra note 68, at 14 (“[C]omplaints prepared by . . . third parties 
typically provide putative plaintiffs insider information to which they would not have otherwise 
had access . . . .”); cf. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Walgreen Co., 
631 F.3d 436, 443 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[Pleading fraud based on information and belief] is permissible, 
so long as (1) the facts constituting the fraud are not accessible to the plaintiff and (2) the plaintiff 
provides the grounds for his suspicions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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Although it may be difficult to distinguish inappropriate bootstrapping 
from beneficial forms of reliance, courts have demonstrated that they are up 
to the challenge.133 Moreover, Rule 11(b)(3) requires courts to ask whether 
an investigation was reasonable under the circumstances.134 As discussed 
above, Rule 11(b)(3) permits reliance on consent orders when the defendant 
attempted a good faith investigation and incorporated the consent order 
into a mix of sources.135 Courts, however, are free to require more when the 
plaintiff approached the line of impermissible bootstrapping.  
As this discussion makes clear, policing reliance on consent orders impli-
cates pleading policies more generally. A flexible notice requirement could 
burden courts and the parties with longer pleadings.136 The reliability and 
attempted verification requirements may also expand the duty of independ-
ent investigation beyond what Rule 11(b)(3) requires on its face. Even the 
more permissive approach under Rule 12(f) and Lipsky, suggested in Part I, 
would shift some power to plaintiffs at the pleadings stage. But this analysis 
implicates more than pleadings policy in private actions. If civil plaintiffs 
were permitted to rely more broadly on consent orders, defendants might 
be less willing to settle government enforcement actions and investigations. 
Such a result might upset public policy, which favors negotiated settlements 
between the government and its enforcement targets.  
III. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Although Rules 12(f) and 11(b)(3) permit broad reliance on consent orders 
at the pleadings stage, public policy may not prefer this result. Government 
agencies often seek to preserve defendants’ incentives to settle enforcement 
actions by limiting the collateral effects of settlements. Accordingly, many 
agencies permit defendants to settle enforcement actions while denying or 
while neither admitting nor denying the allegations against them.137 However, 
 
133 See, e.g., Fraker v. Bayer Corp., No. 08-1564, 2009 WL 5865687, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 
6, 2009) (explaining that courts should evaluate the complaint as a whole to determine whether it 
contains support apart from what was alleged in or inferable from a consent order).  
134 See Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1278-79 (3d Cir. 1994).  
135 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.  
136 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that pleadings should include 
only “short and plain” statements. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
137 For an example of a neither-admit-nor-deny consent order, see supra notes 3-6 and ac-
companying text. The Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice have also permitted 
defendants to settle while denying wrongdoing. See Edward Wyatt, Letting Companies Settle While 
Denying Guilt Reconsidered by F.T.C., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2012, at B3 (discussing the Justice 
Department’s settlement “with the pharmaceutical maker GlaxoSmithKline in which the company 
agreed to pay $2 billion to settle civil charges . . . [but] expressly denied that it had engaged in any 
wrongful conduct”).  
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after the financial crisis, the SEC in particular has been criticized for its 
neither-admit-nor-deny settlement policy.138 Notably, Judge Jed Rakoff of 
the Southern District of New York refused to approve an SEC consent 
order resolving an enforcement action against Citigroup.139 Citing Lipsky, 
Judge Rakoff stated that the settlement was not in the public interest 
because, among other reasons, third parties could not rely on the SEC’s 
allegations to plead claims against Citigroup.140 After Judge Rakoff’s 
decision, the SEC defended its neither-admit-nor-deny policy as a means to 
induce settlement “on favorable terms.”141  
This ongoing debate suggests that any pleadings rule that would en-
hance the collateral consequences of consent orders should be scrutinized 
closely to ensure its impact is minimal. Regulatory agencies generally try to 
avoid any potential chilling effects on settlements, which preserve resources 
and secure relief without the risk and delay of litigation.142 Likewise, targets 
of regulatory actions have strong incentives to settle in order to avoid the 
risks of litigating against the government, such as the collateral risks an 
adverse judgment would have in parallel private actions.143 In the debate 
 
138 See Edward Wyatt, S.E.C., Responding to Critics, Defends ‘No Wrongdoing’ Settlements, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 23, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/s-e-c-chairwoman-
defends-settlement-practices/?_r=0 (“Some people have questioned [the financial] deterrent effect 
and the value of relying on the ‘neither admit nor deny’ clause.”).  
139 See U.S. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
140 Id. at 332-34. The Second Circuit stayed the district court’s proceedings, noting that 
courts generally should not “second-guess” an agency’s decision to enter into neither-admit-nor-
deny settlements. U.S. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 164-65, 169 (2d Cir. 
2012).  
141 See Press Release, SEC, No. 2011-265, SEC Enforcement Director’s Statement on 
Citigroup Case (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-265.htm 
(arguing that “settling on favorable terms even without an admission serves investors, including 
investors victimized by other frauds,” because settling frees up resources that can be used to 
investigate other claims). The SEC has since modified its neither-admit-nor-deny settlement 
policy in limited circumstances. See Public Statement, Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s 
Division of Enforcement, Public Statement by SEC Staff: Recent Policy Change (Jan. 7, 2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1365171489600#.UgqdyZLmuSo 
(announcing that the SEC would no longer permit neither-admit-nor-deny settlements “in the 
minority of our cases where there is a parallel criminal conviction (by plea or verdict) or criminal 
[non-prosecution agreement/deferred prosecution agreement] involving factual or legal claims” 
that overlap); see also James B. Stewart, S.E.C. Has a Message for Firms Not Used to Admitting Guilt, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2013, at B1 (“[T]he [SEC’s] co-leaders of enforcement . . . said there might 
be cases that ‘justify requiring the defendant’s admission of allegations in our complaint or other 
acknowledgment of the alleged misconduct as part of any settlement.’”). 
142 See Press Release, supra note 141 (“[A] settlement puts money back in the pockets of 
harmed investors without . . . the twin risks of losing at trial or winning but recovering less than 
the settlement amount.”); see also Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., supra note 113, at 1091-93 
(“The caseload of the SEC is enormous, and its resources are limited.”).  
143 See Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., supra note 113, at 1093-94 (discussing the “less 
obvious” costs of litigating for defendants, including the possibility of “open[ing] up the 
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over neither-admit-nor-deny policies, defendants would have fewer incen-
tives to settle if regulatory agencies required admissions of liability.144  
If courts permit plaintiffs to rely on consent orders in the manner this 
Comment proposes, it is unclear how this rule would affect settlement 
policy. Defendants may worry that private plaintiffs will use consent orders 
to plead more claims that survive motions to dismiss, thereby increasing the 
litigation costs associated with regulatory settlement. This concern may lead 
defendants to delay settling in order to avoid the public disclosure of facts 
uncovered by the investigation or even to forego settling the action alto-
gether. However, practical parties will likely realize that delay would force 
defendants to incur the costs and risks of litigating against the agency, and 
that private plaintiffs may still be able to incorporate the agency’s findings 
into their case well after they file their initial complaint.145 Moreover, even 
if defendants cannot prevent the release of the agency’s investigative facts, 
they would still be free to contest the allegations in the private litigation. 
Defendants will generally be prepared to do so after dealing with an agency 
investigation involving the same substantive issues.146 In sum, the rules 
proposed in this Comment may have little practical effect on settlement 
dynamics because they stop far short of requiring defendants to admit to 
the findings contained in a consent order.  
Without detailed studies and opinions by experienced practitioners, 
however, one can only surmise that the effects on settlements would be 
limited. But the current state of affairs suggests this belief is reasonable. 
Defendants cannot currently expect to prevail on a motion to strike allega-
tion reciting findings from consent orders because courts are divided on the 
issue.147 It is unclear whether this uncertainty has hampered their willingness 
 
Commission’s findings to discovery in private litigation and . . . even eliminat[ing] the [defend-
ant’s] right to deny the relevant conduct in such proceedings”); see also Brief of Defendant–
Appellee–Cross–Appellant at 36-37, U.S. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5227), 2012 WL 1790381 (arguing that, in electing to settle on a neither-admit-
nor-deny basis, “Citigroup’s management and Board appropriately prioritized its current 
shareholders’ interests in minimizing the adverse collateral consequences associated with being 
adjudicated at fault in this matter, including the enhanced risk of an adverse outcome in [] 
numerous pending private civil litigations”).  
144 See Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., supra note 113, at 1093-94 (describing incentives 
for defendants to settle with a public agency).  
145 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow parties to amend their pleadings once, as a 
matter of course, within twenty-one days of service. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(A). After twenty-one 
days, parties may amend their pleadings only with the consent of the other parties or with the 
court’s leave, but “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 
15(a)(2). 
146 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.  
147 See supra Section I.B.  
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to settle or incentivized them to delay settling. The uncertainty may not 
have deterred private plaintiffs from piggybacking off of consent orders 
either, as defendant companies increasingly face simultaneous regulatory 
and private actions.148 Moreover, negotiated settlements still carry some 
collateral risk for defendants that do not depend on whether a consent 
order’s findings are recited in a complaint. For example, consent orders are 
admissible at trial for purposes other than to establish liability, such as to 
prove knowledge of a legal obligation.149 Thus, the rules proposed in this 
Comment may not dramatically affect defendants’ cost–benefit calculations 
in deciding whether or not to settle an enforcement action.  
There may be other interests at stake, however, beyond preserving in-
centives to settle. If private plaintiffs can rely on consent orders to bring 
piggyback actions that are more likely to prevail on a motion to dismiss, 
defendants will wish to minimize “inflammatory language” in consent 
orders.150 This outcome could affect other regulatory goals, such as using 
broadly worded settlement documents to “send a message” to industry 
participants.151 But as argued above, it is by no means certain that agencies 
seek to send a message by deliberately overstating their factual (as opposed 
to legal) case in consent orders.152 Courts can also require reasonably 
detailed and objective statements of fact before approving consent orders, 
although the predilection to do so may vary by judge.153 Given the lack of 
evidence or even discussion about settlement dynamics involving statements 
of fact in consent orders,154 it is not clear what impact this threat might have 
on public policy favoring negotiated settlements. Such concerns are worth 
evaluating carefully, and stakeholders should discuss them in light of how 
frequently plaintiffs seek to rely on consent orders.  
 
148 Adam S. Hakki et al., The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Regulatory Landscape and the 
Resulting Implications for Securities Class Action Litigation (“It is increasingly the norm for a company 
to face simultaneous government proceedings and private actions at the state and federal level.”), 
in HANDLING A SECURITIES CASE: FROM INVESTIGATION TO TRIAL AND EVERYTHING IN 
BETWEEN 85 (2012).  
149 See United States v. Gilbert, 668 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming the district court’s 
decision to admit into evidence an SEC consent decree “to show that [the defendant] knew of the 
SEC reporting requirements”).  
150 See Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., supra note 113.  
151 Id. at 1092.  
152 See id.  
153 See DiSarro, supra note 14, at 278 (noting that “the injunctive provisions of a consent 
decree must be stated in reasonable detail” and “the court can insist that a proposed decree be 
changed”); see also SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(describing the court’s condition that it would not approve a consent judgment unless the parties 
provided detailed factual statements).  
154 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.  
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CONCLUSION 
Lipsky cautioned that “courts should not tamper with the pleadings un-
less there is a strong reason for so doing.”155 This Comment demonstrates 
that courts have overlooked this warning by tampering too much with 
pleadings that rely on or refer to consent orders. Rules 12(f) and 11(b)(3) 
broadly permit plaintiffs to rely on consent orders to allege facts establish-
ing a claim of liability, subject to certain conditions outlined above. But 
interested parties and commentators have yet to weigh in on whether broad 
permission to rely on consent orders is desirable given public policy favor-
ing settlement of enforcement actions. If broad permission is not desirable, 
then we must determine how to implement new restrictions on plaintiffs at 
the pleadings stage.  
As the discussion of Lipsky and its progeny suggests, courts should not 
interpret Rule 12(f) to require striking allegations based on consent orders 
because of regulatory enforcement policy. This result would undermine 
settled law granting motions to strike only for irrelevant, unsubstantiated, 
and prejudicial allegations. Nor should courts require a heightened duty of 
independent investigation under Rule 11(b)(3) solely for allegations relying 
on consent orders. This approach would not advance Rule 11’s objective of 
improving the quality of pleadings and the thoroughness of prefiling 
investigations. The best method of preserving the status quo in regulatory 
enforcement may be to impose statutory restrictions on plaintiffs who rely 
on consent orders in certain high-risk areas. Congress, for example, has 
“tampered” with pleadings requirements involving private securities fraud 
claims to limit the impact of strike suits.156 Our experience in that context 
may inform whether Congress should intervene here.  
 
 
155 Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976).  
156 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. 
V 2012) (requiring plaintiffs in a private securities fraud action to “state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind”).  
